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llvm-mirror/lib/Target/X86/X86TargetMachine.cpp
Chandler Carruth 5c3f34f10b Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today, specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection", and is one of the two halves to Spectre..
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that this
is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero blog post
for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html

The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative execution
of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by poisoning the
prediction of indirect branches with the address of that gadget. The
gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a side channel for
reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a load of secret data
followed by a branch on the loaded value and then a load of some
predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing of the processors
cache to determine which direction the branch took *in the speculative
execution*, and in turn what one bit of the loaded value was. Due to the
nature of these timing side channels and the branch predictor on Intel
processors, this allows an attacker to leak data only accessible to
a privileged domain (like the kernel) back into an unprivileged domain.

The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In many
cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches and
a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering switches in
this way and the first step of this patch is to disable jump-table
lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite explicit indirectbr
sequences into a switch over integers.

However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as
a trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures the
processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known location. The
retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto the stack by the
call with the desired target of the original indirect call. The result
is a predicted return to the next instruction after a call (which can be
used to trap speculative execution within an infinite loop) and an
actual indirect branch to an arbitrary address.

On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this device.
For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register and so several
different retpoline variants are introduced to use a scratch register if
one is available in the calling convention and to otherwise use direct
stack push/pop sequences to pass the target address.

This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886

We also support a target feature that disables emission of the retpoline
thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users want them.
These are particularly useful in environments like kernels that
routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch their thunk to
different code sequences. They can write this custom thunk and use
`-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to `-mretpoline`. In this
case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
  __llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
  __llvm_external_retpoline_eax
  __llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
  __llvm_external_retpoline_edx
  __llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.

There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.

The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are from
precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we have
found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on them
here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.

For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z retpolineplt`
(or use similar functionality from some other linker). We strongly
recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows the
retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.

When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typical workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately 2%)
even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely due to
the small number of indirect branches that occur in performance
sensitive paths of the kernel.

When using these patches on statically linked applications, especially
C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more dramatic
performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch, indirect-, or
virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from 10% to 50%.

However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically reduce
the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting them to
direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to lower
switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++ applications, we
*strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call targets are statically
linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both PGO and ThinLTO. Well
tuned servers using all of these techniques saw 5% - 10% overhead from
the use of retpoline.

We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality available
as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd really like to
get these patches landed and backported ASAP for obvious reasons. We're
planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0 release streams and get
a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked ASAP for distros and vendors.

This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month: Eric, Reid,
Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit due to the time
sensitive nature of landing this and the need to backport it. Huge thanks to
everyone who helped out here, and everyone at Intel who helped out in
discussions about how to craft this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at
Google, but not an LLVM contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline
design.

Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer

Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits

Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723

llvm-svn: 323155
2018-01-22 22:05:25 +00:00

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//===-- X86TargetMachine.cpp - Define TargetMachine for the X86 -----------===//
//
// The LLVM Compiler Infrastructure
//
// This file is distributed under the University of Illinois Open Source
// License. See LICENSE.TXT for details.
//
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
//
// This file defines the X86 specific subclass of TargetMachine.
//
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
#include "X86TargetMachine.h"
#include "MCTargetDesc/X86MCTargetDesc.h"
#include "X86.h"
#include "X86CallLowering.h"
#include "X86LegalizerInfo.h"
#include "X86MacroFusion.h"
#include "X86Subtarget.h"
#include "X86TargetObjectFile.h"
#include "X86TargetTransformInfo.h"
#include "llvm/ADT/Optional.h"
#include "llvm/ADT/STLExtras.h"
#include "llvm/ADT/SmallString.h"
#include "llvm/ADT/StringRef.h"
#include "llvm/ADT/Triple.h"
#include "llvm/Analysis/TargetTransformInfo.h"
#include "llvm/CodeGen/ExecutionDomainFix.h"
#include "llvm/CodeGen/GlobalISel/CallLowering.h"
#include "llvm/CodeGen/GlobalISel/IRTranslator.h"
#include "llvm/CodeGen/GlobalISel/InstructionSelect.h"
#include "llvm/CodeGen/GlobalISel/Legalizer.h"
#include "llvm/CodeGen/GlobalISel/RegBankSelect.h"
#include "llvm/CodeGen/MachineScheduler.h"
#include "llvm/CodeGen/Passes.h"
#include "llvm/CodeGen/TargetLoweringObjectFile.h"
#include "llvm/CodeGen/TargetPassConfig.h"
#include "llvm/IR/Attributes.h"
#include "llvm/IR/DataLayout.h"
#include "llvm/IR/Function.h"
#include "llvm/Pass.h"
#include "llvm/Support/CodeGen.h"
#include "llvm/Support/CommandLine.h"
#include "llvm/Support/ErrorHandling.h"
#include "llvm/Support/TargetRegistry.h"
#include "llvm/Target/TargetOptions.h"
#include <memory>
#include <string>
using namespace llvm;
static cl::opt<bool> EnableMachineCombinerPass("x86-machine-combiner",
cl::desc("Enable the machine combiner pass"),
cl::init(true), cl::Hidden);
namespace llvm {
void initializeWinEHStatePassPass(PassRegistry &);
void initializeFixupLEAPassPass(PassRegistry &);
void initializeX86CallFrameOptimizationPass(PassRegistry &);
void initializeX86CmovConverterPassPass(PassRegistry &);
void initializeX86ExecutionDomainFixPass(PassRegistry &);
void initializeX86DomainReassignmentPass(PassRegistry &);
} // end namespace llvm
extern "C" void LLVMInitializeX86Target() {
// Register the target.
RegisterTargetMachine<X86TargetMachine> X(getTheX86_32Target());
RegisterTargetMachine<X86TargetMachine> Y(getTheX86_64Target());
PassRegistry &PR = *PassRegistry::getPassRegistry();
initializeGlobalISel(PR);
initializeWinEHStatePassPass(PR);
initializeFixupBWInstPassPass(PR);
initializeEvexToVexInstPassPass(PR);
initializeFixupLEAPassPass(PR);
initializeX86CallFrameOptimizationPass(PR);
initializeX86CmovConverterPassPass(PR);
initializeX86ExecutionDomainFixPass(PR);
initializeX86DomainReassignmentPass(PR);
}
static std::unique_ptr<TargetLoweringObjectFile> createTLOF(const Triple &TT) {
if (TT.isOSBinFormatMachO()) {
if (TT.getArch() == Triple::x86_64)
return llvm::make_unique<X86_64MachoTargetObjectFile>();
return llvm::make_unique<TargetLoweringObjectFileMachO>();
}
if (TT.isOSFreeBSD())
return llvm::make_unique<X86FreeBSDTargetObjectFile>();
if (TT.isOSLinux() || TT.isOSNaCl() || TT.isOSIAMCU())
return llvm::make_unique<X86LinuxNaClTargetObjectFile>();
if (TT.isOSSolaris())
return llvm::make_unique<X86SolarisTargetObjectFile>();
if (TT.isOSFuchsia())
return llvm::make_unique<X86FuchsiaTargetObjectFile>();
if (TT.isOSBinFormatELF())
return llvm::make_unique<X86ELFTargetObjectFile>();
if (TT.isKnownWindowsMSVCEnvironment() || TT.isWindowsCoreCLREnvironment())
return llvm::make_unique<X86WindowsTargetObjectFile>();
if (TT.isOSBinFormatCOFF())
return llvm::make_unique<TargetLoweringObjectFileCOFF>();
llvm_unreachable("unknown subtarget type");
}
static std::string computeDataLayout(const Triple &TT) {
// X86 is little endian
std::string Ret = "e";
Ret += DataLayout::getManglingComponent(TT);
// X86 and x32 have 32 bit pointers.
if ((TT.isArch64Bit() &&
(TT.getEnvironment() == Triple::GNUX32 || TT.isOSNaCl())) ||
!TT.isArch64Bit())
Ret += "-p:32:32";
// Some ABIs align 64 bit integers and doubles to 64 bits, others to 32.
if (TT.isArch64Bit() || TT.isOSWindows() || TT.isOSNaCl())
Ret += "-i64:64";
else if (TT.isOSIAMCU())
Ret += "-i64:32-f64:32";
else
Ret += "-f64:32:64";
// Some ABIs align long double to 128 bits, others to 32.
if (TT.isOSNaCl() || TT.isOSIAMCU())
; // No f80
else if (TT.isArch64Bit() || TT.isOSDarwin())
Ret += "-f80:128";
else
Ret += "-f80:32";
if (TT.isOSIAMCU())
Ret += "-f128:32";
// The registers can hold 8, 16, 32 or, in x86-64, 64 bits.
if (TT.isArch64Bit())
Ret += "-n8:16:32:64";
else
Ret += "-n8:16:32";
// The stack is aligned to 32 bits on some ABIs and 128 bits on others.
if ((!TT.isArch64Bit() && TT.isOSWindows()) || TT.isOSIAMCU())
Ret += "-a:0:32-S32";
else
Ret += "-S128";
return Ret;
}
static Reloc::Model getEffectiveRelocModel(const Triple &TT,
Optional<Reloc::Model> RM) {
bool is64Bit = TT.getArch() == Triple::x86_64;
if (!RM.hasValue()) {
// Darwin defaults to PIC in 64 bit mode and dynamic-no-pic in 32 bit mode.
// Win64 requires rip-rel addressing, thus we force it to PIC. Otherwise we
// use static relocation model by default.
if (TT.isOSDarwin()) {
if (is64Bit)
return Reloc::PIC_;
return Reloc::DynamicNoPIC;
}
if (TT.isOSWindows() && is64Bit)
return Reloc::PIC_;
return Reloc::Static;
}
// ELF and X86-64 don't have a distinct DynamicNoPIC model. DynamicNoPIC
// is defined as a model for code which may be used in static or dynamic
// executables but not necessarily a shared library. On X86-32 we just
// compile in -static mode, in x86-64 we use PIC.
if (*RM == Reloc::DynamicNoPIC) {
if (is64Bit)
return Reloc::PIC_;
if (!TT.isOSDarwin())
return Reloc::Static;
}
// If we are on Darwin, disallow static relocation model in X86-64 mode, since
// the Mach-O file format doesn't support it.
if (*RM == Reloc::Static && TT.isOSDarwin() && is64Bit)
return Reloc::PIC_;
return *RM;
}
static CodeModel::Model getEffectiveCodeModel(Optional<CodeModel::Model> CM,
bool JIT, bool Is64Bit) {
if (CM)
return *CM;
if (JIT)
return Is64Bit ? CodeModel::Large : CodeModel::Small;
return CodeModel::Small;
}
/// Create an X86 target.
///
X86TargetMachine::X86TargetMachine(const Target &T, const Triple &TT,
StringRef CPU, StringRef FS,
const TargetOptions &Options,
Optional<Reloc::Model> RM,
Optional<CodeModel::Model> CM,
CodeGenOpt::Level OL, bool JIT)
: LLVMTargetMachine(
T, computeDataLayout(TT), TT, CPU, FS, Options,
getEffectiveRelocModel(TT, RM),
getEffectiveCodeModel(CM, JIT, TT.getArch() == Triple::x86_64), OL),
TLOF(createTLOF(getTargetTriple())) {
// Windows stack unwinder gets confused when execution flow "falls through"
// after a call to 'noreturn' function.
// To prevent that, we emit a trap for 'unreachable' IR instructions.
// (which on X86, happens to be the 'ud2' instruction)
// On PS4, the "return address" of a 'noreturn' call must still be within
// the calling function, and TrapUnreachable is an easy way to get that.
// The check here for 64-bit windows is a bit icky, but as we're unlikely
// to ever want to mix 32 and 64-bit windows code in a single module
// this should be fine.
if ((TT.isOSWindows() && TT.getArch() == Triple::x86_64) || TT.isPS4())
this->Options.TrapUnreachable = true;
initAsmInfo();
}
X86TargetMachine::~X86TargetMachine() = default;
const X86Subtarget *
X86TargetMachine::getSubtargetImpl(const Function &F) const {
Attribute CPUAttr = F.getFnAttribute("target-cpu");
Attribute FSAttr = F.getFnAttribute("target-features");
StringRef CPU = !CPUAttr.hasAttribute(Attribute::None)
? CPUAttr.getValueAsString()
: (StringRef)TargetCPU;
StringRef FS = !FSAttr.hasAttribute(Attribute::None)
? FSAttr.getValueAsString()
: (StringRef)TargetFS;
SmallString<512> Key;
Key.reserve(CPU.size() + FS.size());
Key += CPU;
Key += FS;
// FIXME: This is related to the code below to reset the target options,
// we need to know whether or not the soft float flag is set on the
// function before we can generate a subtarget. We also need to use
// it as a key for the subtarget since that can be the only difference
// between two functions.
bool SoftFloat =
F.getFnAttribute("use-soft-float").getValueAsString() == "true";
// If the soft float attribute is set on the function turn on the soft float
// subtarget feature.
if (SoftFloat)
Key += FS.empty() ? "+soft-float" : ",+soft-float";
// Keep track of the key width after all features are added so we can extract
// the feature string out later.
unsigned CPUFSWidth = Key.size();
// Translate vector width function attribute into subtarget features. This
// overrides any CPU specific turning parameter
unsigned PreferVectorWidthOverride = 0;
if (F.hasFnAttribute("prefer-vector-width")) {
StringRef Val = F.getFnAttribute("prefer-vector-width").getValueAsString();
unsigned Width;
if (!Val.getAsInteger(0, Width)) {
Key += ",prefer-vector-width=";
Key += Val;
PreferVectorWidthOverride = Width;
}
}
FS = Key.slice(CPU.size(), CPUFSWidth);
auto &I = SubtargetMap[Key];
if (!I) {
// This needs to be done before we create a new subtarget since any
// creation will depend on the TM and the code generation flags on the
// function that reside in TargetOptions.
resetTargetOptions(F);
I = llvm::make_unique<X86Subtarget>(TargetTriple, CPU, FS, *this,
Options.StackAlignmentOverride,
PreferVectorWidthOverride);
}
return I.get();
}
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
// Command line options for x86
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
static cl::opt<bool>
UseVZeroUpper("x86-use-vzeroupper", cl::Hidden,
cl::desc("Minimize AVX to SSE transition penalty"),
cl::init(true));
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
// X86 TTI query.
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
TargetTransformInfo
X86TargetMachine::getTargetTransformInfo(const Function &F) {
return TargetTransformInfo(X86TTIImpl(this, F));
}
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
// Pass Pipeline Configuration
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
namespace {
/// X86 Code Generator Pass Configuration Options.
class X86PassConfig : public TargetPassConfig {
public:
X86PassConfig(X86TargetMachine &TM, PassManagerBase &PM)
: TargetPassConfig(TM, PM) {}
X86TargetMachine &getX86TargetMachine() const {
return getTM<X86TargetMachine>();
}
ScheduleDAGInstrs *
createMachineScheduler(MachineSchedContext *C) const override {
ScheduleDAGMILive *DAG = createGenericSchedLive(C);
DAG->addMutation(createX86MacroFusionDAGMutation());
return DAG;
}
void addIRPasses() override;
bool addInstSelector() override;
bool addIRTranslator() override;
bool addLegalizeMachineIR() override;
bool addRegBankSelect() override;
bool addGlobalInstructionSelect() override;
bool addILPOpts() override;
bool addPreISel() override;
void addMachineSSAOptimization() override;
void addPreRegAlloc() override;
void addPostRegAlloc() override;
void addPreEmitPass() override;
void addPreEmitPass2() override;
void addPreSched2() override;
};
class X86ExecutionDomainFix : public ExecutionDomainFix {
public:
static char ID;
X86ExecutionDomainFix() : ExecutionDomainFix(ID, X86::VR128XRegClass) {}
StringRef getPassName() const override {
return "X86 Execution Dependency Fix";
}
};
char X86ExecutionDomainFix::ID;
} // end anonymous namespace
INITIALIZE_PASS_BEGIN(X86ExecutionDomainFix, "x86-execution-domain-fix",
"X86 Execution Domain Fix", false, false)
INITIALIZE_PASS_DEPENDENCY(ReachingDefAnalysis)
INITIALIZE_PASS_END(X86ExecutionDomainFix, "x86-execution-domain-fix",
"X86 Execution Domain Fix", false, false)
TargetPassConfig *X86TargetMachine::createPassConfig(PassManagerBase &PM) {
return new X86PassConfig(*this, PM);
}
void X86PassConfig::addIRPasses() {
addPass(createAtomicExpandPass());
TargetPassConfig::addIRPasses();
if (TM->getOptLevel() != CodeGenOpt::None)
addPass(createInterleavedAccessPass());
// Add passes that handle indirect branch removal and insertion of a retpoline
// thunk. These will be a no-op unless a function subtarget has the retpoline
// feature enabled.
addPass(createIndirectBrExpandPass());
}
bool X86PassConfig::addInstSelector() {
// Install an instruction selector.
addPass(createX86ISelDag(getX86TargetMachine(), getOptLevel()));
// For ELF, cleanup any local-dynamic TLS accesses.
if (TM->getTargetTriple().isOSBinFormatELF() &&
getOptLevel() != CodeGenOpt::None)
addPass(createCleanupLocalDynamicTLSPass());
addPass(createX86GlobalBaseRegPass());
return false;
}
bool X86PassConfig::addIRTranslator() {
addPass(new IRTranslator());
return false;
}
bool X86PassConfig::addLegalizeMachineIR() {
addPass(new Legalizer());
return false;
}
bool X86PassConfig::addRegBankSelect() {
addPass(new RegBankSelect());
return false;
}
bool X86PassConfig::addGlobalInstructionSelect() {
addPass(new InstructionSelect());
return false;
}
bool X86PassConfig::addILPOpts() {
addPass(&EarlyIfConverterID);
if (EnableMachineCombinerPass)
addPass(&MachineCombinerID);
addPass(createX86CmovConverterPass());
return true;
}
bool X86PassConfig::addPreISel() {
// Only add this pass for 32-bit x86 Windows.
const Triple &TT = TM->getTargetTriple();
if (TT.isOSWindows() && TT.getArch() == Triple::x86)
addPass(createX86WinEHStatePass());
return true;
}
void X86PassConfig::addPreRegAlloc() {
if (getOptLevel() != CodeGenOpt::None) {
addPass(&LiveRangeShrinkID);
addPass(createX86FixupSetCC());
addPass(createX86OptimizeLEAs());
addPass(createX86CallFrameOptimization());
}
addPass(createX86WinAllocaExpander());
}
void X86PassConfig::addMachineSSAOptimization() {
addPass(createX86DomainReassignmentPass());
TargetPassConfig::addMachineSSAOptimization();
}
void X86PassConfig::addPostRegAlloc() {
addPass(createX86FloatingPointStackifierPass());
}
void X86PassConfig::addPreSched2() { addPass(createX86ExpandPseudoPass()); }
void X86PassConfig::addPreEmitPass() {
if (getOptLevel() != CodeGenOpt::None) {
addPass(new X86ExecutionDomainFix());
addPass(createBreakFalseDeps());
}
addPass(createX86IndirectBranchTrackingPass());
if (UseVZeroUpper)
addPass(createX86IssueVZeroUpperPass());
if (getOptLevel() != CodeGenOpt::None) {
addPass(createX86FixupBWInsts());
addPass(createX86PadShortFunctions());
addPass(createX86FixupLEAs());
addPass(createX86EvexToVexInsts());
}
}
void X86PassConfig::addPreEmitPass2() {
addPass(createX86RetpolineThunksPass());
}