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llvm-mirror/lib/Target/AArch64/AArch64.h
Kristof Beyls 12ed09fb71 Introduce control flow speculation tracking pass for AArch64
The pass implements tracking of control flow miss-speculation into a "taint"
register. That taint register can then be used to mask off registers with
sensitive data when executing under miss-speculation, a.k.a. "transient
execution".
This pass is aimed at mitigating against SpectreV1-style vulnarabilities.

At the moment, it implements the tracking of miss-speculation of control
flow into a taint register, but doesn't implement a mechanism yet to then
use that taint register to mask off vulnerable data in registers (something
for a follow-on improvement). Possible strategies to mask out vulnerable
data that can be implemented on top of this are:
- speculative load hardening to automatically mask of data loaded
  in registers.
- using intrinsics to mask of data in registers as indicated by the
  programmer (see https://lwn.net/Articles/759423/).

For AArch64, the following implementation choices are made.
Some of these are different than the implementation choices made in
the similar pass implemented in X86SpeculativeLoadHardening.cpp, as
the instruction set characteristics result in different trade-offs.
- The speculation hardening is done after register allocation. With a
  relative abundance of registers, one register is reserved (X16) to be
  the taint register. X16 is expected to not clash with other register
  reservation mechanisms with very high probability because:
  . The AArch64 ABI doesn't guarantee X16 to be retained across any call.
  . The only way to request X16 to be used as a programmer is through
    inline assembly. In the rare case a function explicitly demands to
    use X16/W16, this pass falls back to hardening against speculation
    by inserting a DSB SYS/ISB barrier pair which will prevent control
    flow speculation.
- It is easy to insert mask operations at this late stage as we have
  mask operations available that don't set flags.
- The taint variable contains all-ones when no miss-speculation is detected,
  and contains all-zeros when miss-speculation is detected. Therefore, when
  masking, an AND instruction (which only changes the register to be masked,
  no other side effects) can easily be inserted anywhere that's needed.
- The tracking of miss-speculation is done by using a data-flow conditional
  select instruction (CSEL) to evaluate the flags that were also used to
  make conditional branch direction decisions. Speculation of the CSEL
  instruction can be limited with a CSDB instruction - so the combination of
  CSEL + a later CSDB gives the guarantee that the flags as used in the CSEL
  aren't speculated. When conditional branch direction gets miss-speculated,
  the semantics of the inserted CSEL instruction is such that the taint
  register will contain all zero bits.
  One key requirement for this to work is that the conditional branch is
  followed by an execution of the CSEL instruction, where the CSEL
  instruction needs to use the same flags status as the conditional branch.
  This means that the conditional branches must not be implemented as one
  of the AArch64 conditional branches that do not use the flags as input
  (CB(N)Z and TB(N)Z). This is implemented by ensuring in the instruction
  selectors to not produce these instructions when speculation hardening
  is enabled. This pass will assert if it does encounter such an instruction.
- On function call boundaries, the miss-speculation state is transferred from
  the taint register X16 to be encoded in the SP register as value 0.

Future extensions/improvements could be:
- Implement this functionality using full speculation barriers, akin to the
  x86-slh-lfence option. This may be more useful for the intrinsics-based
  approach than for the SLH approach to masking.
  Note that this pass already inserts the full speculation barriers if the
  function for some niche reason makes use of X16/W16.
- no indirect branch misprediction gets protected/instrumented; but this
  could be done for some indirect branches, such as switch jump tables.

Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D54896

llvm-svn: 349456
2018-12-18 08:50:02 +00:00

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//==-- AArch64.h - Top-level interface for AArch64 --------------*- C++ -*-==//
//
// The LLVM Compiler Infrastructure
//
// This file is distributed under the University of Illinois Open Source
// License. See LICENSE.TXT for details.
//
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
//
// This file contains the entry points for global functions defined in the LLVM
// AArch64 back-end.
//
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
#ifndef LLVM_LIB_TARGET_AARCH64_AARCH64_H
#define LLVM_LIB_TARGET_AARCH64_AARCH64_H
#include "MCTargetDesc/AArch64MCTargetDesc.h"
#include "Utils/AArch64BaseInfo.h"
#include "llvm/Support/DataTypes.h"
#include "llvm/Target/TargetMachine.h"
namespace llvm {
class AArch64RegisterBankInfo;
class AArch64Subtarget;
class AArch64TargetMachine;
class FunctionPass;
class InstructionSelector;
class MachineFunctionPass;
FunctionPass *createAArch64DeadRegisterDefinitions();
FunctionPass *createAArch64RedundantCopyEliminationPass();
FunctionPass *createAArch64CondBrTuning();
FunctionPass *createAArch64CompressJumpTablesPass();
FunctionPass *createAArch64ConditionalCompares();
FunctionPass *createAArch64AdvSIMDScalar();
FunctionPass *createAArch64ISelDag(AArch64TargetMachine &TM,
CodeGenOpt::Level OptLevel);
FunctionPass *createAArch64StorePairSuppressPass();
FunctionPass *createAArch64ExpandPseudoPass();
FunctionPass *createAArch64SpeculationHardeningPass();
FunctionPass *createAArch64LoadStoreOptimizationPass();
FunctionPass *createAArch64SIMDInstrOptPass();
ModulePass *createAArch64PromoteConstantPass();
FunctionPass *createAArch64ConditionOptimizerPass();
FunctionPass *createAArch64A57FPLoadBalancing();
FunctionPass *createAArch64A53Fix835769();
FunctionPass *createFalkorHWPFFixPass();
FunctionPass *createFalkorMarkStridedAccessesPass();
FunctionPass *createAArch64BranchTargetsPass();
FunctionPass *createAArch64CleanupLocalDynamicTLSPass();
FunctionPass *createAArch64CollectLOHPass();
InstructionSelector *
createAArch64InstructionSelector(const AArch64TargetMachine &,
AArch64Subtarget &, AArch64RegisterBankInfo &);
FunctionPass *createAArch64PreLegalizeCombiner();
void initializeAArch64A53Fix835769Pass(PassRegistry&);
void initializeAArch64A57FPLoadBalancingPass(PassRegistry&);
void initializeAArch64AdvSIMDScalarPass(PassRegistry&);
void initializeAArch64BranchTargetsPass(PassRegistry&);
void initializeAArch64CollectLOHPass(PassRegistry&);
void initializeAArch64CondBrTuningPass(PassRegistry &);
void initializeAArch64CompressJumpTablesPass(PassRegistry&);
void initializeAArch64ConditionalComparesPass(PassRegistry&);
void initializeAArch64ConditionOptimizerPass(PassRegistry&);
void initializeAArch64DeadRegisterDefinitionsPass(PassRegistry&);
void initializeAArch64ExpandPseudoPass(PassRegistry&);
void initializeAArch64SpeculationHardeningPass(PassRegistry&);
void initializeAArch64LoadStoreOptPass(PassRegistry&);
void initializeAArch64SIMDInstrOptPass(PassRegistry&);
void initializeAArch64PreLegalizerCombinerPass(PassRegistry&);
void initializeAArch64PromoteConstantPass(PassRegistry&);
void initializeAArch64RedundantCopyEliminationPass(PassRegistry&);
void initializeAArch64StorePairSuppressPass(PassRegistry&);
void initializeFalkorHWPFFixPass(PassRegistry&);
void initializeFalkorMarkStridedAccessesLegacyPass(PassRegistry&);
void initializeLDTLSCleanupPass(PassRegistry&);
} // end namespace llvm
#endif